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Third Space, Social Media and Everyday Political Talk 
Scott Wright, Todd Graham, and Daniel Jackson 
 
Abstract 
Theoretical and empirical research into online politics to date has primarily focused 
on what might be called formal politics or on how activists and social movements 
utilize social media to pursue their goals. However, in this chapter, we argue that 
there is much to be gained by investigating how political talk and engagement 
emerges in everyday, online, lifestyle communities: i.e. third spaces. Such spaces are 
not intended for political purposes, but rather ± during the course of everyday talk ± 
become political through the connections people make between their everyday lives 
and the political/social issues of the day. In this chapter, we develop a theoretically 
informed argument for research that focuses on everyday informal political talk in 
online third spaces. 
 
Introduction 
Thanks to its ubiquity, social media are increasingly being used by governments, 
elected politicians, political candidates, activists and citizens for political purposes. 
As such, the dynamics of political communication and civic engagement in these 
communicative spaces and networks have become a central nub of concern for 
scholars across a range of disciplines. As will be shown in more detail below, much 
scholarly attention in this sphere focuses on the activities of political elites in their 
attempts to communicate with the masses, or on how activists and social movements 
utilize social media to pursue their goals. The focus is therefore on the dynamics of 
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communication and engagement on social media in clearly political settings and often 
involving explicitly political actors. While much of this research has emphasized the 
potential of online spaces and networks for political knowledge-sharing, interpersonal 
deliberation and coordinated collective action, we argue here that it ignores the 
³everydayness´ of political communication and engagement ± and the importance of 
everyday political talk ± and the lifestyle spaces and networks where such talk 
emerges.  
 Taking forward a new agenda for online deliberation research (Wright 2012a, 
2012b), this chapter steps back from the domain of formal politics, and develops a 
theoretically-informed argument for research that focuses on the interactions of 
³ordinary´ FLWL]HQV¶LQIRUPDOSROLWLFDOWDONLQHYeryday online spaces. First, we argue 
for the adoption of a more expansive notion of political talk: one that embraces the 
vernacular, expressive and porous characteristics of everyday public speech. We 
define political talk as something that a) emerges in the process of everyday talk, 
often interweaved with conversations that do not have a political character; b) 
includes mundane reflections upon power, its uses and ramifications; and c) possesses 
qualities that enable it to contribute to meaningful public action.  
We are also concerned with where such talk occurs online, particularly in 
everyday, formally non-political, online ³third spaces´: public spaces beyond the 
home (first space) or work (second space) where people can meet and interact 
informally and where political talk, organizing and action can occur. We are 
especially interested in the array of online communities dedicated to lifestyle issues 
such as personal finance, parenting/childcare, popular culture, sports, and hobbies. 
Such spaces, we argue, foster a connection between the personal and political and can 
potentially help bridge the gap between the everyday lives of participants and formal 
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politics. Our initial investigations of such spaces/communities suggests that much of 
the talk that takes place in these fora constitutes political talk that is reciprocal, 
reflexive and (often) deliberative and of a kind that could inform devolved, 
autonomous, self-representation, potentially activating people to mobilize and 
organize (collective) political action (Graham 2010, 2012; Graham and Harju 2011; 
Graham and Wright 2014; Graham et al. 2015).  
In the following section, we provide a brief overview of the field of online 
deliberation research. Second, we establish the importance of everyday political talk 
as both an expression of political participation and as an essential lubricant to other 
forms of engagement. However, there are debates over the nature of political talk. 
Must it be deliberative, or do the more ambiguous and permissive environments 
offered by social and online media lead us to seek other ways to understand political 
talk embedded in the everyday? Third, we discuss the concept of third space, and set 
out the existing research in this area. Fourth, third space has been primarily associated 
with, and analyzed through, discussion forum-based communities. Here, we discuss 
and consider whether social media such as Facebook and Twitter constitute third 
spaces. Finally, we argue that everyday political talk ± particularly in third spaces ± 
has the potential to overcome many of the identified issues with online deliberation, 
including political polarization and the avoidance of political talk.  
 
The Internet, Social Media and Online Deliberation 
The nature of political deliberation online has been studied for decades. We can 
identify four distinct phases within this research, characterized by attempts to keep 
pace with technological developments and interrelated changes in the sites and 
practice of online deliberation. In the earliest phase, there was little if any empirical 
4 
 
research; scholars tended to put forward hypotheses about what political debate would 
look like. For example, there was extensive debate about whether the perceived 
anonymity of online communication would lead people to talk more freely about 
politics, and often polarized debates about whether the Internet would be positively 
revolutionize deliberation or be its death knell (Rheingold, 1993). In response to this 
period of hype, there was an empirical turn in the literature ± often described as the 
cyber-realist school because the evidence largely disproved the earlier hype. Scholars 
such as Davis (1999) and Wilhelm (2000), for example, operationalized Habermas-
inspired definitions of deliberation to analyze political debate on Usenet discussion 
forums, finding that talk online was largely not deliberative but marked by 
polarization and flaming. Moreover, as the use and understanding of the internet as a 
space for political debate expanded, this was accompanied by more refined theorizing 
of the Internet as a public sphere and space for deliberation (see e.g. Papacharissi 
2004; Dahlberg 2001). The third phase of the research acknowledged that the nature 
of deliberation online depended on a range of factors including the design of the 
website interface (e.g. Wright and Street 2007), the nature of the moderation and 
facilitation (e.g. Wright 2006) and how existing comments shape interaction (e.g. 
Sukumaran et al. 2011). It was also marked by a focus on the websites of formal 
politics, such as governments (e.g. Wright 2006, 2007; Coleman and Blumler 2009), 
legislatures/parliaments (e.g. Lusoli et al. 2006), political parties (e.g. Jackson and 
Lilleker 2009a) and elected representatives (e.g. Jackson and Lilleker 2009b; Gibson 
et al. 2003).  
More recently, studies of the political uses and impacts of ³newer´ social 
media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have blossomed and a small 
sub-stream of this has focused on analyzing the nature of debate that occurs in these 
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spaces. Often this follows similar themes to the early research, such as how technical 
affordances and moderation shape deliberation ± while there also remains a 
significant focus on formal political actors and events. For example, Halpern and 
Gibbs (2013) have analyzed interactions on the Facebook and YouTube channels of 
the White House, finding that the greater anonymity of YouTube debates leads to 
more flaming and impoliteness than Facebook. Other studies have focused solely on 
Facebook, examining deliberative norms in newspaper Facebook pages (e.g. Stroud et 
al. 2014), pages set up to discuss public matters (e.g. Es et al. 2014), and political 
SDUWLHV¶ use of Facebook pages to facilitate citizen dialogue (e.g. Steenkamp and 
Hyde-Clarke 2014).  
Research into the nature of political debate on Twitter has been more 
voluminous, and we give only a brief summary here of some key points and 
arguments (much of this literature is discussed elsewhere in this volume). Boynton et 
al. (2014) have analyzed tweets mentioning the word ³Obama´, capturing around 
200,000 messages a day. Comparing their findings with previous research, they 
conclude that: ³SROLWLFDO communication on Twitter is a domain that is differentiable 
from the main Twitter stream >« there is] much greater use of hashtags, retweets, and 
urls in the political domain than what is true for the total stream of Twitter PHVVDJHV´ 
(Boynton et al. 2014: 14). This points to Bruns and Burgess (2011b) earlier findings 
that ad hoc publics sometimes formed around hashtags. Second, research has shown 
that political debates on Twitter tend to be highly polarized, though topic, norms and 
the predilection of users affect this within the communication structure of Twitter 
(Colleoni et al. 2014; Himelboim et al. 2013). Third, numerous studies have identified 
often highly active super-participants (Graham and Wright 2014) in political debates 
on Twitter; these people often hold important positions in discussion networks; and 
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they tend to come from the political classes (Larsson and Moe 2012; Bruns and 
Burgess 2011a).  
While much has been learned, there are, however, some important limitations 
in the literature on political debate and social media ± that repeat patterns identified in 
earlier phases (Wright 2012a). First, surprisingly few studies analyze whether 
political debate in spaces such as Facebook and Twitter is deliberative ± and related 
debates over what models of talk, discussion or deliberation should be used to assess 
this. Surprisingly, there has been very little focus on the extent to which such 
platforms foster discursive reciprocal exchange: the extent to which participants are 
actually reading and replying to each RWKHU¶V posts; and the level of continuity ± 
extended reciprocal exchange on a particular issue so that (normatively speaking) 
deeper levels of understanding can be achieved such as reflexivity and 
(communicative) empathy. Yet, words such as ³conversation´, ³discussion´ and 
³debate´ are routinely used.  Second, there has been a disproportionate focus on 
formal political actors (e.g. elected representatives, candidates, activists, and 
journalists), institutions (e.g. political parties, campaign organizations) and external 
political events (elections, consultations, TV debates) in these spaces. Research ± be it 
for methodological reasons or choice ± has often not focused on the very aspects of 
social media that are marked out for it being so important: the facilitation of informal 
political talk amongst everyday citizens. While focusing on political hashtags, actors 
and events might by expedient in terms of research manageability, the danger is that 
this largely captures the usual political suspects ± ignoring the vast amount of 
everyday political talk in such spaces. Let us unpack this analysis of social media and 
deliberation further by outlining exactly why everyday political talk is worthy of our 
attention.  
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Everyday Political Talk: Why Is It Important? 
Everyday political talk is considered an important aspect of democratic citizenship. It 
performs a key educative role in terms of citizenship; it is where public opinion can 
IRUPDQG³LQHYHU\FRQYHUVDWLRQLQZKLFKSULYDWHLQGLYLGXDOVDVVHPEOHWRIRUPD
SXEOLFERG\´LWFRQVWLWXWHV³DSRUWLRQRIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH´+DEHUPDV
Everyday conversations have been VKRZQWRFKDQJHSHRSOH¶VSROLWLFDODWWLWXGHV
(Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Political talk can be considered a ³IXQGDPHQWDOXQGHUSLQQLQJ
RIGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\´EHFDXVHIRU.LPDQG.LP³WKURXJKHYHU\GD\
political talk, citizens construct their identities, achieve mutual understanding, 
produce public reason, form considered opinions, and produce rules and resources for 
GHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\´ Similarly, Mansbridge (1999) argues that everyday political 
talk is a key aspect of the deliberative system. She conceives deliberation as a broader 
process, spread throughout time and space. It is the web of everyday political talk, 
which takes place over time and across different discursive spaces that prepare 
citizens, the public sphere and the political system at large for political action. While 
Mansbridge (1999: 212) notes that everyday talk is not always deliberative because it 
can lack considered, critical reflection ± VKHDUJXHVWKDW³WKHRULVWVRIGHOLEHUDWLRQ
RXJKWWRSD\DVPXFKDWWHQWLRQWRFLWL]HQV¶ everyday talk as to formal deliberation in 
SXEOLFDUHQDV´QRWOHDVWEHFDXVHLISHRSOHGRQRWXQGHUVWDQGKRZWRWDONDQGOLVWHQ
formal public deliberations can fail.  
Dahlgren argues that discussion is one of six prerequisites for participatory 
democracy (alongside knowledge, values, experience, identities, and affinity). In this 
sense, everyday political talk can be pre/proto-political; latent or standby; and 
³potentially SROLWLFDO´± LPSRUWDQWWRWKH³PLFURG\QDPLFVRIGHPRFUDF\´'DKOJUHQ 
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2006: 282). SuFKODWHQWIRUPVRISDUWLFLSDWLRQFDQWKXVEH³DJRRGJDWHZD\WRZDUGWKH
VWLUULQJVRIDEURDGHUVRFLDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV´+RZHFUHDWLQJDVHQVHRISXEOLF
empowerment and voice (Coleman 2013: 219±220). Finally, some scholars (e.g. 
Barber 1984; Fearson 1998) argue that political talk encourages shared perspective 
building, or what McAfee (2000: 134±135) calls complementary agency: 
intersubjective processes whereby people link their personal ideas, issues, and actions 
with one another, cultivating political agency, solidarity and community. Many 
scholars recognize and argue for the importance of everyday political talk to 
democracy. However, what it should look like is a highly contested normative debate, 
and it is to this debate we now turn. 
 
The Nature of Everyday Political Talk 
Normative debates about the nature of everyday political talk have generally occurred 
in response to criticisms that using formal, typically Habermas-inspired models of 
deliberation is unrealistic and unfair. First, such an account ignores the nature of 
political talk, which tends to be fragmented, anecdotal, messy, incomplete, and less 
formally deliberative. Dahlgren (2006: 278±279, see also Van Zoonen 2005), for 
H[DPSOHFDXWLRQVDJDLQVW³FOLQJLQJWRRULJLGO\WRIRUPDOGHOLEHUDWLRQ´EHFDXVHWKLV
³ULVNVORVLQJVLJKWRIHYHU\GD\WDONDQGLWVSRWHQWLDOUHOHYDQFHIRUGHPRFUDF\7KHUH
remains an awful lot of discussion which can have political relevance but which has 
QRVWDWXVLQDVWULFWGHOLEHUDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH>«@,WLVYLDPHDQGHULQJ and 
unpredictable talk that the political can be generated, that the links between the 
SHUVRQDODQGWKHSROLWLFDOFDQEHHVWDEOLVKHG´ 
Second, privileging reasoning by means of argumentation as the only relevant 
communicative form also ignores the plurality and differences within modern 
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Western societies. As Eckersley (2001) argues, deliberation based solely of rationality 
SULYLOHJHVD³JHQWOHPHQ¶VFOXE´LWLV³WRRGLVSDVVLRQDWHUDWLRQDOLVWGLVHPERGLHG
masculine, and Western/Eurocentric in its orientation in insisting only on certain 
modes of rational, critical argument in political discourse.´ Similarly, Warren (2006: 
VWDWHV³7KRVHRQWKHRXWVLGHPXVWRIWHQVKRXWLQRUGHUWRHQWHUWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQ
and when they shout, they do so with accents, mannerisms, and ways of making 
SRLQWVWKDWGRQ¶WILWZLWKWKHGRPLQDQWPRGHORIGHOLEHUDWLRQ.´  
This has led some scholars to call for the adoption of a more expansive notion 
of political talk: one that embraces the vernacular, expressive and porous 
characteristics of everyday public speech, rather than strictly instrumental or 
institution-bound conceptions. Within the context of deliberation and the public 
sphere, we have seen, for example, an emphasis on the performative (Kohn 2000); on 
the importance of rhetoric (Mayhew 1997); on the role of humor (Basu 1999); and 
other communicative forms such as storytelling, the use of narratives and greeting 
(e.g. Dryzek 2000). The role of emotions in deliberation and political talk has also 
been a key area of debate. Rosenberg (2004), for example, maintains that productive 
deliberation requires emotional connections between participants. Such connections, 
IRUH[DPSOHIXHODSDUWLFLSDQW¶VHIIRUWWRXQGHUVWDQGRWKHUSRVLWLRQVDQGDUJXPHQWV 
Regarding online political talk, much of the empirical-based research has 
adopted very rational, Habermasian inspired models of deliberation (see Graham and 
Witschge 2003; Kies 2010), focusing on for example the level of rational-critical 
debate, reciprocity, discursive equality, and excluding most, if not all, of the other 
communicative forms and styles of political talk discussed above (some exceptions 
include: Polletta and Lee 2006; Graham 2009; 2010; 2012*UDKDP¶V
comparison of political talk between the (political) Guardian Talkboard (which 
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closed in 2011) and two forums dedicated to fans of reality TV, for example, found 
that expressives (humor, emotional comments, acknowledgements) were a common 
ingredient, accounting for a third or more of the posts in each case. Moreover, 
expressives tended to impede political talk in the Guardian while facilitate it in the 
formally non-political forums of reality TV. Graham attributes it to two factors (156±
161): the topic and nature of political talk. His findings suggest that online political 
forums dedicated to traditional politics, like the *XDUGLDQ¶V7DONERDUG, tend to foster 
a communicative environment centered on ³winning´ the debate. The use of 
expressives in such an atmosphere, when they were not ignored or discouraged, were 
used in a strategic way (e.g. humor as an ad homien attack against other participants). 
While in the forums dedicated to reality TV, expressives seemed to play an important 
role in enhancing and facilitating political talk by fostering deeper levels of 
understanding and solidarity. This was due to the nature of the forum (2009: 168):  
 
³>WKH\ZHUHFRPPXQLFDWLYHVSDFHV@ZKHUHWKHPL[LQJRIWKHSULYDWHDQGSXEOLF
was the norm, [spaces] where participants took personal experiences and life 
lessons and bridged them to society at large, fostering a more personal and 
lifestyle-based form of politics. All of this seemed to foster a communicative 
environment that was about learning rather than winning or convincing. It was 
an environment that seemed to promote solidarity rather than polarization 
DPRQJSDUWLFLSDQWV´ 
 
The nature of political talk in everyday online communities dedicated to lifestyle 
issues, topics and needs (e.g. TV/Films, parenting, personal finance) tend to be deeply 
rooted in the personal (see also Graham and Wright 2014; Graham et al. 2015; Van 
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Zoonen 2007). As researchers, they provide us a glimpse, at the micro-level, of the 
blurring between private and public, personal and political. We move on now to 
discuss the concept of third space where this type of talk is occurring. 
 
³Third Space´ and Everyday Political Talk 
While many researchers have made a compelling case for the importance of everyday 
political talk, the problem, as Mansbridge noted, is that such talk is rarely analyzed. 
For Hay (2002: 4±³we need political analysis which refuses to restrict its 
analytical attentions to obviously political variables and processes«´ while Saward 
(2003: 166) FRQFXUV³An extraordinary feature of the literature on deliberative 
democracy has been its unwillingness to take an encompassing view of democratic 
sites, instLWXWLRQVDQGSURFHGXUHV´%XLOGLQJRQ%DXPDQ¶VFRQFHSWRIOLTXLG
modernity, Papacharissi (2011) argues that in an era of convergence (or perhaps 
hybridization in &KDGZLFN¶VODQJXDJH³WKHSROLWLFDOEHFRPHVPRUHHOXVLYHDV
there exist no longer sites that are anchored to politics, confirming what Arendt 
WHUPHGDQHPSWLQHVVRISROLWLFDOVSDFH´3DSDFKDULVVL7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQ
that the context does not matter, or that we can apply some kind of random, scattergun 
approach:  
 
³,IZHDFFHSWWKDWDOOIRUPVRIWDONDUHRISRWHQWLDOUHOHYDQWIRUFLYLF
discussion, that politics can materialise even in unexpected contexts of daily 
conversation, this does not mean we would want to study any and all contexts 
of verbal interaction. Obviously, we would have to be selective about where 
we aim our analytical searchlights, trying to glean that which is beginning to 
percolate politicDOO\´ 
12 
 
 
This leads us to the importance of the spaces wherein political talk emerges, and we 
now turn to concepts of third space.   
7KHFRQFHSWRIWKLUGVSDFHLVEXLOWRQDFULWLTXHRI5D\2OGHQEXUJ¶VFRQFHSWRI
the third place. A third place, for Oldenburg, is a public space beyond the home or 
workplace where people can meet and interact informally. As the name suggests, they 
are place based spaces; the common denominator is the location of the participants 
DQGWKDWFRPPXQLW\FDQWKULYH³7KHWKLUGSODFHLVDJHQHULFGHVLJQDWLRQIRUDJUHDt 
variety of public spaces that host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily 
DQWLFLSDWHGJDWKHULQJVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DQGLVDFRUHVHWWLQJRILQIRUPDOSXEOLFOLIH´
(1999: 16). Oldenburg argues that third places perform a crucial role in the 
development of societies and communities, helping to strengthen citizenship and thus 
DUH³FHQWUDOWRWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVRIDGHPRFUDF\´: 67). Oldenburg cites 
numerous examples of third places from the traditional English pub to a Parisian cafe. 
It should be noted that, for Oldenburg, it is not that certain types of venue constitute a 
third place; rather they exist when venues and participants exhibit certain 
characteristics: they are place-based arenas beyond home and work with easy access, 
and a home away from home feel that is neutral and typically has a group of regulars 
that set the tone. In other words, not all pubs are third places: they are constructed 
through specific social and environmental characteristics. Mirroring de Tocqueville, 
Oldenburg argues that in third places decency is more highly regarded than wealth, 
VWDWXVRUHGXFDWLRQ)RU/DVFKVXFK³FRQVLGHUDWLRQVPDNHLWDSSURSULDWHWR
argue that third place sociability, in a modest way, encourages virtues more properly 
associated with political life than with the µcivil society¶ made up of voluntary 
DVVRFLDWLRQV´/DVFKDOVRFRQIHUVXSRQWKLUGSODFHDQGWKHHYHU\GD\
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SROLWLFDOWDONDQLPSRUWDQW³SURWRSROLWLFDO´VWDWXVDQGTXHVWLRQVZKHWKHU³WKHGHFOLQH
of participatory democracy may be directly related to the disappearance of third 
SODFHV´ 
Oldenburg was highly critical of the idea of virtual communities and the 
network society, which he feared isolated people in their homes (1999: 77) and so 
³atomized the citizenry that the WHUPµVRFLHW\¶PD\ QRORQJHUEHDSSURSULDWH´
204). Nevertheless, scholars of virtual community have considered whether they 
might be equivalent to a third place. Rheingold (2003: 10) for example, suggested that 
ZKLOHRQOLQHFRPPXQLWLHV³might not be the same kind of place that Oldenburg had in 
PLQG>«@PDQ\RIKLVGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKLUGSODFHVFRXOGDOVRGHVFULEHWKH:(//
[online community]. Perhaps cyberspace is one of the informal public places where 
people can rebuild the aspects of community that were lost when the malt shop 
EHFDPHDPDOO´7KLVDQDO\VLVZDVEURDGO\VXSSRUWHGE\Steinkuehler and Williams 
(2006) empirical study of whether online gaming platforms can be considered third 
SODFHVZKLFKWKH\FRQFOXGHGZKHUH³QHZDOEHLWYLUWXDOµWKLUG SODFHV¶IRULQIRUPDO
VRFLDELOLW\«´ 
Wright (2012b) has taken the theoretical analysis deeper, arguing for a re-
theorization of the concept of third place. He argues that we should not privilege 
place-based communities over issue (or other communities) that often exist on and 
offline and that while there are barriers to participation in third spaces, there are also 
numerous barriers to third places. Following Oldenburg, third spaces can be 
commercial environments and are formally non-political, but political talk emerges 
within them through everyday conversation. A third space is, thus, a formally non-
political online discussion space where political talk can emerge (see Wright 2012b 
for more details).  
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 The analysis of online third spaces has started to take root, and we now know 
significantly more about the nature of political talk in such spaces ± particularly 
within discussion forum-based lifestyle communities. First, it is worth noting that 
there is a significant amount of political talk in third spaces. Drawing on a 
representative national sample, Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009: 45) found that the most 
frequently visited types of online (discussion forum-based) communities ± those 
revolving around e.g. hobbies ± were in essence political with 53 percent of American 
participants engaging in political talk within such spaces. Focusing on the nature and 
quality of debate, a growing body of case studies have shown that political talk not 
only emerges in lifestyle communities, but it can be deliberative (as discussed above), 
and that it is typically deeply rooted in the personal, the everyday (Graham 2010; 
2012; Graham and Harju 2011; Graham and Wright 2014; Van Zoonen 2007), and 
can lead to political actions or calls to action (Graham et al. 2015). 
 Much of the research done on third spaces focuses primarily on older social 
media platforms, namely discussion forums. However, what about new, popular 
social media platforms/networks? Some of the research discussed above (and below) 
has shown that there is a lot of formal and everyday political comments (and perhaps 
debate) on social media. However, it remains unclear whether Facebook and Twitter ± 
or different parts of these social media ± meet the criteria of a third space. It is to this 
question that we now turn. 
 
Twitter and Facebook: Third Spaces? 
Clearly, Facebook and Twitter have highly political areas, be it political party or 
elected representative Facebook pages and groups or Twitter accounts, while people 
can also use political hashtags to link their tweets to specific political public spheres. 
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We would argue that such areas are not third spaces because they are explicitly 
SROLWLFDO+RZHYHULQDVLPLODUYHLQWR+DEHUPDV¶UHYLVHGPRGHORIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH
there are constellations of public, private and potentially third spaces within social 
media. Put simply, the question is not whether Facebook or Twitter is a third space, 
but whether there are pages, profiles (and so on) that constitute a third space. While 
explicitly political Facebook groups and hashtags do not meet the criteria of a third 
space, the problem ± as with the broader definitions of politics and the political 
discussed in this chapter ± is that what constitutes a political hashtag has what might 
be called soft edges. Thus, there is an element of judgment involved in making such 
distinctions. Because researchers often use explicitly political hashtags (when not 
focusing on political actors or events) to create an initial corpus of political tweets, we 
argue that there has been relatively little research into the potential for third spaces to 
form on social networking sites (SNS). There are several ways to overcome this 
limitation, such as to select clearly non-political hashtags. However, our concerns do 
not stop here. 
As has been argued previously, the design of public space affects the nature of 
deliberation WKDWRFFXUVEHLW³URRPVEXLOGLQJVVWUHHWVVTXDUHVSDUNVHWF´'UXFNHU
and Gumpert 1996: 280) or the nature of website interfaces and the norms and 
structures of communication (Wright and Street 2007). We are concerned that the 
interface design and discursive structure in Twitter and on Facebook groups, pages, 
and profiles might serve to undermine the potential for third spaces to form. To 
explain our concerns, we will focus on Twitter. In theory, we believe that a hashtag 
could constitute a third space, including having a group of ³regulars´ and the structure 
of a discursive community (see Bruns and Burgess 2011b). However, it remains 
unclear whether hashtags might be so fluid and lacking in a sense of a group identity 
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amongst the regulars that they do not form a third space. Put simply, the discursive 
formations in social media such as Twitter might lack the requisite sense of identity 
that contributes to third space, and thus they are at best weak examples of third space. 
Second, the structural form of communication on Twitter, and to a lesser extent 
Facebook groups/pages, does not facilitate deliberation (as argued above regarding 
reciprocity). In particular, the lack of threading and often more broadcast (as opposed 
to discursive) form on Twitter makes meaningful reciprocal and reflexive interaction 
harder, thus potentially hindering the development of deeper relationships, a sense of 
community. 
Recent research on everyday political talk on Twitter supports such an 
analysis. For example, Brooker et al. (2015) found that Twitter discussion of a 
controversial British TV documentary on people receiving state welfare (Benefits 
Street) tended to be more kneejerk, one-off (as opposed to discursive) comments in 
the broadcast form. However, ³off peak´ participants (i.e. the debates that continued 
after the broadcast) tended to have more depth, bringing in their own experiences and 
perspectives to counter or support narratives from the documentary, and to broaden 
the debate to broader social issues that would be indicative of a third space. Semaan et 
DO¶VTXDOLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIVRFLDOPHGLDXVHDPRQJVW86FLWL]HQVfound that 
participants used a range of political and non-political spaces, routinely switching 
between platforms to meet their needs and that they went out of their way to seek out 
a diverse range of information and discussants. Put simply, participants noted that 
each medium had different characteristics (e.g., Twitter is a broadcast medium, their 
Facebook profile is more private) and shaped their interactions accordingly. This 
suggests that to understand third space online, we might need to move beyond 
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focusing on individual platforms in isolation (Wright 2012a), and to study the 
interactions on and between these platforms in hybrid forms (Chadwick 2013).  
 
Political Polarization and the Avoidance of Politics 
One of the most prominent debates, to date, has been whether the internet will 
become polarized, with like-minded people flocking together, enabling them to ignore 
alternative viewpoints. This is problematic because ³WKHEHQHILWVRIGHOLEHUDWLRQ
depend on disagreement, which is defined in terms of interaction among citizens who 
hold divergent viewpoints and perspectives reJDUGLQJSROLWLFV´+XFNIHOGW et al 2004: 
11). Surveys, for example, show that Americans regularly talk about politics in their 
everyday lives, but that this is amongst like-minded people (Mutz, 2006). Often 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK6XQVWHLQ¶V) Daily Me, the fear is that online debate could 
exDFHUEDWHWKLVSUREOHP³GLVFXVVLRQVYLDWKH,QWHUQHWDUHPRUHOLNHO\WREHDVQDUURZ
or perhaps even narrower than those across the backyard fence. Those with differing 
views gravitate to their own discussion groups´'DYLs and Owen 1998: 124). For 
Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (1997: 3±4)WKLVLVEHFDXVH³,I,7SURYLGHVDOXEULFDQW
WKDWDOORZVIRUWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRISUHIHUHQFHVDJDLQVWWKHIULFWLRQRIJHRJUDSK\´VXFK
as communicating with like-minded people, the internet might lead to apparently 
³ORFDOKHWHURJHQHLW\´WR³JLYHZD\WRYLUWXDOKRPRJHQHLW\DVFRPPXQLWies coalesce 
DFURVVJHRJUDSKLFERXQGDULHV´ 
The potential for homophily are explicitly embedded into the architecture of 
much social and digital media. Search technologies and the increasing personalization 
of the internet experience can facilitate this, using past actions and choices to filter 
³your´ internet. For example, we can choose to add and remove Facebook friends, 
which has a filtering effect, but this is exacerbated by the Edgerank filter, which 
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attempts to sort the information presented to people potentially without the user even 
realizing (Pariser 2011). While this can be seen as a helpful way to cope with data 
overload, and can in theory improve the user experience, there are concerns that it can 
UHPRYHDOWHUQDWLYHSROLWLFDOYLHZVIURPSHRSOH¶VIHHGV 
Empirical research has often found that politics online is polarized. For 
example, Gilbert¶V et al. (2009: 2) study of blogs found that they were echo chambers, 
with agreement outnumbering disagreement in comments by over 3:1, and this rose to 
9:1 for political blogs. Bloggers are often found to be segregated along political 
boundaries (Adamic and Glance 2005; Lawrence et al. 2010). Social network analysis 
has identified similar trends in Twitter topic networks (Himelboim et al. 2013) and on 
political debates on Twitter more broadly (e.g. Smith et al. 2014). Content analysis of 
political, and particularly partisan-framed online groups, has also found polarization 
(e.g. Davis 1999; Wilhelm 2000). News and broader political information 
consumption online has a polarized structure that leads to the reinforcement rather 
than challenging of existing views (e.g. Smith 2011).  
The picture is not completely straightforward though. A large-scale, broader 
study by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) found that ³LGHRORJLFDOVHJUHJDWLRQRQWKH
,QWHUQHWLVORZLQDEVROXWHWHUPV«´ and there is evidence that people at least claim to 
want to hear alternative voices (Stromer-Galley 2003). Of course, people may still 
attempt to avoid people or threads where they experience or perceive cross cutting 
GHEDWH$V0XW]DUJXHV³7KHOHYHORIKHWHURJHQHLW\LQDSHUVRQ¶VSROLWLFDO
network is not necessarily the same as the heterogeneity of the social context he or she 
inhabits. One can certainly influence the other, but hearing the other side takes place 
at the level of discussants within a network rather than within some larger, aggregate 
VRFLDOFRQWH[W´,QRWKHUZRUGVZHQHHGWo analyze not just macro-heterogeneity but 
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also actual interactions at the micro-level, and this speaks to the danger that people 
can simply choose to avoid talking about politics online: that there is not just a left-
right polarization, but also a polarization between those that do, and do not, talk about 
politics online. 
The notion of avoiding politics is perhaps most strongly associated with Nina 
(OLDVRSK¶VVHPLQDOHWKQRJUDSKLFDQDO\VLVof political talk in (offline) arenas like 
social clubs in America. Eliasoph (1998) observed that when political issues were 
mentioned, people avoided talking about the issue because they did not want to show 
disagreement or ignorance. Both Mutz and Martin (2001) and Noelle-Neumann 
(1984) have reported what can be seen as related findings: the spiral of silence theory 
suggests that if people feel that they belong to a majority it encourages political talk. 
Having set out these challenges, how might third spaces provide an environment that 
can limit them?  
We argue, following Brundidge (2011) and Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) that 
political talk in third spaces is less likely to be polarized and quite simply it is harder 
to ³avoid´. Why might this be so? First, to polarize would require that people had, 
and understood, ideologically informed views that they could gather around, which is 
not necessarily true outside of the political classes in countries such as the UK where 
there has been a shift to the center and more fluid political identity (Wright 2012b). 
Second, whether this be a discussion forum, Facebook group, or Twitter hashtags, 
people normally ³visit´ third spaces because of some kind of shared tie, be it that they 
have an interest in cooking, fashion, football, or parenthood. Crucially, though, the tie 
is not political and thus while people might have similarity in background, it is more 
likely that people will inadvertently (Brundidge, 2011) come across people with 
divergent political views as social boundaries appear to be weakened online. Third, 
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while we argue that third spaces are a form of virtual community ± many people have 
a strong sense of community identity with strong ties ± third spaces have a fluidity 
that facilitates a wide range of weak ties too. If Mutz (2006: 54) is correct to argue 
that: ³The solution [to political polarization] resides in part in more political 
conversations among µweak ties¶, that is those who are not intimate friends or family 
PHPEHUV´, we believe that third spaces facilitate this. Subsequent, work by 
Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) tested their hypothesis: the dominant form of political 
interaction online was found to be homogenous, as would be expected given their 
earlier research. However, their representative survey data found that non-political 
forums were less polarized than explicitly political ones. Thus, we argue: ³>«@
fragmentation theory makes little sense once we move beyond the politically oriented 
communicative landscape´*UDKDPDQG+DUMX 2011: 29). While there may be 
polarization within forums around specific topics or sub-forums, this is rarely about 
SROLWLFVDQGVLPLODUO\VRPHSHRSOHPLJKWDYRLG³SROLWLFDO´VXE-forums, but such talk 
emerges across a wide range of threads, sub-forums and topics (Graham et al. 2015; 
Graham and Wright 2014).  
 
 Conclusion 
Social media represents part of an ongoing convergence between media, audiences, 
and publics. Here, convergence melds and blurs traditional boundaries among media 
and audiences; citizens and consumers; and producers and consumers (Papacharissi, 
2011). There is an important opportunity here then, to see social media as occupying 
the ambiguous territory of everyday public space, where the personal and even the 
private can quite comfortably overlap with the political. As our chapter has shown, 
across a range of social media platforms, everyday political talk is present, and in 
21 
 
some cases thriving. For us, this makes understanding the dynamics of these everyday 
encounters of pressing concern for researchers.  
Much of our focus of late, and within this chapter, is on a) everyday political 
talk and b) third spaces. Such work is establishing third spaces as places where we 
can better understand the interwoven nature of politics and everyday life. Moreover, 
whilst the vast majority of conversations in such spaces are non-political, when 
conversation does turn political we are discovering how it can overcome some of the 
problems traditionally found in online discussion in political spaces. We should not be 
nonchalant about such findings: they contradict many early theoretical and empirical 
studies, and should prompt us to ask further questions about what is happening in 
such spaces. Here, more work should examine the relationship between talk in 
everyday spaces and political action. Our own work has begun to unpack this, but 
many questions remain, not least the flows of conversations and political actions 
between online and offline environments, and between different social media 
platforms. 
Understanding the dynamics of everyday political talk and participation 
matters. It has much to say in the context of ongoing reflections on the health of civic 
life in many Western democracies. As Papacharissi (2011: 78) argues, ³it is possible 
that our quest for civic behaviors has not produced the desired results because we 
have not been looking at places that civic behaviors now inhabit: spaces that are 
friendlier to the development of contemporary civic behaviors´. If we look in the right 
places, and ask the right questions, we can see some of the new repertoires emerging 
through social media.  
Here, we see numerous fruitful avenues for future research on third spaces. 
The first is the relationship between some third spaces and government or government 
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agencies. Whilst they are first and foremost ³non-political´ everyday spaces devoted 
to various lifestyle issues, forums such as Netmums and MoneySavingExpert in the 
UK have attracted the attention of government officials, who are tapping into the 
online communities for policy consultation purposes (see Graham et al. 2015). Further 
research into the nature and impact of these relationships is important.  
Another area in need of further research is the views of participants in the 
forums. This could include interviews with key actors, such as people identified as 
having made calls to political action and forum administrators and owners. The 
former could explore whether actions were actually taken and what role the forum 
played, while the latter could help us to better understand how owners conceive the 
political role (if any) of their forum, and whether/how they go about facilitating this. 
Alongside interviews, focus groups or surveys with a broader range of participants 
FRXOGH[SORUHSHRSOH¶VYLHZVRISROLWLFDOWDONDQGFDOOVWRDFWLRQLQWKHIRUXPGRWKH\
avoid it?); whether they get involved in political actions through the forum (and what 
influences this decision); and the background and broader political activity of 
SDUWLFLSDQWVLVLWWKHµXVXDOVXVSHFWV¶" 
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